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De Re and De Dicto
THOMAS JAGER

It is widely recognized that the modal sentence 'Necessarily, Socrates is
wise' can be interpreted in two different ways. Under the first interpretation, the
de re interpretation, it is understood as saying that Socrates has the property of
being wise essentially; i.e., that Socrates has the property of being wise in every
possible world in which Socrates exists. Under the second interpretation, the de
dicto interpretation, it is understood as saying that the proposition Socrates is
wise is true in every possible world. In [3] and [4] Plantinga has suggested a way
of understanding the notion of necessity using the concept of essence: a property E which is exemplified in some possible world and is such that, in every possible world, for every x, if x has E then: (a) x has E essentially and (b) in no
world does anything distinct from x have E. Using this notion of essence, an
applied semantics can be introduced for both de re and de dicto necessity which
satisfies the doctrine of serious actualism, that, necessarily, there are no objects
that do not exist and objects can have properties only in worlds in which they
do exist. For a first-order modal language L, a corresponding formal semantics
for de re necessity (and denial) and de dicto necessity (and denial) can be introduced (the systems A and A* of [2]). Because L contains a single necessity operator and a single denial operator, it does not allow for the simultaneous
treatment of both kinds of interpretations. In this paper the language L is
extended by introducing a new class of operators; the result is a language rich
enough to support a semantics treating de re and de dicto notions simultaneously. The formal semantics introduced is characterized axiomatically.
Initially one might think that the problem of formally representing the two
senses of necessity simultaneously can be solved by introducing two necessity
operators, Di and D 2 , so that
(1) Di (Socrates is wise)
is interpreted as Socrates is essentially wise, and
(2) D 2 (Socrates is wise)
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